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RIGHT TO SET-OFF BENEFITS AGAINST DAMAGES TO
PROPERTY IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS
To insure protection of the individual landowner against pos-
sible abuse by the state in the exercise of its sovereign power,' the
law of eminent domain is hedged with specific constitutional and
statutory inhibitions, limitations and restrictions. Probably the
most fundamentally important safeguard from the standpoint of
protection to the landowner in this regard is the requirement that
the state pay adequate compensation for the property taken and
for any injury done. The law in this respect contemplates that
the injured landowner be made whole by an award which, in the
universal language of our constitutions, statutes and court decisions
on the subject, is termed "just compensation"." But the "meas-
uring stick" by which the so-called "just compensation" is to be
juridically computed, like most principles in our law is subject to
changing variations and interpretations. That the measure of
1 McCORm Ic, LAw op DAxAGES (1935) 520.
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damages is the difference between the market value of the property
immediately before and immediately after the improvement or
alteration causing the injury, as it is put by many courts,2. is but
a loose and fragmentary statement of the law; and although sound-
ing in all-encompassing perspective, it is subject to the limitation
that the compensation, as in fact awarded in all our jurisdictions,
with probably no more than one exception,3 is made up in part by
benefits which accrued to the property and which are not reflected
in the valuation placed on it subsequent to the improvement.-
The right to set-off these benefits against the aggregate physical
damage suffered by the property is the question with which this
note primarily proposes to deal.
A careful analysis of the problem here presented requires that
certain fumdamentals on this phase of the law of eminent domain
be inquired into. First, the nature of the invasion of the property
right will, depending upon the jurisdiction, have a bearing on the
problem. Apparently where some land is taken most jurisdiction
permit a set-off of special benefits against both the value of the
land actually taken and damages to the residue.5 In some states,
however, as in New York and Georgia, the land actually taken must
be paid for in full, but general and special benefits may be set-off
against damages to the remainder.6  West Virginia7 and many
other states, notably Illinois," Oregon,9 Virginia,"0 and Wisconsin"-
had adopted the rule that land actually taken must be paid for in
full, without reference to benefits; and that special benefits only
may be deducted from damages to the remainder. Apparently only
one state has gone so far as to permit neither general nor special
benefits to be deducted.'2 Statutes which reflect the policy of the
particular state through the implementation of provisions in most,
2 Swift & Co. v. Newport News, 105 Va. 108, 52 S. E. 821 (1906); Stewart
v. Ohio River R. R., 38 W. Va. 438, 18 S. E. 604 (1893); Nelson v. Atlanta,
138 Ga. 252, 75 S. E. 245 (1912).
3 Brown v. Beatty, 34 Miss. 227, 69 Am. Dec. 389 (1857) ; Sullivan v. Board
of Supervisors of Lafayette County, 61 Miss. 271 (1883).
4 Blair v. Charleston, 43 W. Va. 62, 26 S. E. 341 (1896).
r, MCCORmICK, LAW op DAMAGES 548.
0 Augusta v. .Marks, 50 Ga. 612 (1874) ; City of Atlanta v. Glenn, 17 Ga. App.
619, 87 S. E. 910 (1916) ; New York, W. & B. R. R. v. Siebrecht, 73 Misc. 219,
130 N. Y. Supp. 1005 (1911).
7 Jones v. Clarksburg, 84 W. Va. 247, 99 S. E. 484 (1919).
8 Gordon v. Highways Comm'rs, 169 fli. 510, 48 N. E. 451 (1897) ; Depart-
ment of Public Works & Bldgs. v. Caldwell, 301 Ill. 242, 133 N. E. 642 (1922).
0 Beekman v. Jackson County, 18 Ore. 283, 22 Pac. 1074 (1890).
10 Williamson v. Read, 106 Va. 453, 56 S. E. 174 (1907).
11 Driver v. Western Union R. R., 32 Wis. 569, 14 Am. Rep. 726 (1873).
12 Penrice v. Wallis, 37 Miss. 172 (1859).
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if not all, state constitutions serve as a basis for the "measuring
stick" adopted by the different jurisdictions. While it is true that
some courts have taken the view that all damages were contemplated
and included in the payment of compensation when the land was
taken, and thus that any later damages sustained to abutting
property short of an actual taking were damnum absque injuria15
the prevailing view is to allow a recovery in such cases 4 Here
also the measure of damages is the same, apparently, where only
damage is done and no part of the property is taken as it is where
part has been appropriated and part has been left."9
Consideration of the theory motivating our legislatures and
our courts in their treatment of this problem calls also for at-
tempted differentiation between general and special benefits.
Special -benefits are said to be those resulting from a public work
which appreciably enhances the value of the particular tract" as
distinguished from the general benefits the particular public im-
provement has brought to the community at large. 'Our court has
said that peculiar benefits "are those that particularly and ex-
clusively affect the particular property," and admits that an exact
definition is not susceptible of judicial determination.17 This con-
cept of special benefits would apparently include all benefits except
those the owner derives from the improvement in common with
the public at large. General benefits, on the other hand, are uni-
versally said to be those that arise from an increase in the value
of the land, common to the community generally, from advantages
which would accrue to'the community from the improvement, and
which are conjectural and incapable of estimation, and may never
be realized.'
Though elusive and probably inadequate as a basis for deter-
mining into what class named benefits may fall, the distinction just
given as to the nature of general and special benefits is sufficient
to indicate a valid basis for the rule enunciated in those juris-
dictions permitting a deduction of special benefits only." The
theory is that the increase in the value of property contiguous to
13 Crane v. Harrison, 40 Idaho 186, 232 Pac. 578 (1925); Northern Trans-
portation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635, 25 L. Ed. 336 (1879).
14 Jones v. Clarksburg, 84 W. Va. 247, 99 S. E. 484 (1919), and cases cited
therein.
15 Swift & Co. v. Newport News, 105 Va. 108, 52 S. E. 821 (1906) ; Hardy v.
Simpson, 118 W. Va. 440, 191 S. E. 47 (1937).
16 Brand v. Union Elevated Ry., 258 Ill. 133, 101 N. E. 247 (1913).
17 Blair v. Charleston, 43 W. Va. 62, 26 S. E. 341 (1896).
18 Beveridge v. Lewis, 137 Cal. 619, 67 Pac. 1040 (1902).
19 Nelson County v. Loving, 126 Va. 283, 101 S. E. 406 (1919).
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a public improvement such as a highway which is common to the
whole neighborhood is reflected in the valuation placed on it for
assessment purposes, and becomes a part of the tax bill of the
owner.20 To permit deduction of general benefits, therefore, would,
in effect, be charging the owner twice for the same benefits. An-
other reason of equal or greater force is that if the rest of the pub-
lic are to secure free this "unearned increment" from the im-
provement, so also should the landowner whose property is taken
or damaged.2' This conclusion is based on the view that it is in-
equitable to charge the owner whose property is damaged for a
benefit which the rest of the community likewise secures but does
not pay for. The West Virginia rule, prior to 1933, was founded
on this principle, and that irrespective of whether the particular
injury to the landowner involved a taking of property or merely
damage by virtue of extended use of an existing easement.2 On
this latter proposition, to avoid the difficulty experienced in some
jurisdictions of stretching existing constitutional provisions pro-
viding for compensation for land taken, to include also that dam-
aged,23 the West Virginia Constitution of 1872 was changed on this
point so as to read: "Private property shall not be taken or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation."124  Our statute
prior to 1933 specifically provided that in the determination of
damages to the residue of land taken special or peculiar, but not
general benefits, were to be deducted.
2
-
Despite this well-established principle, a landowner who, in a
practical sense, is actually as well off fnancially after his land
has been taken or injured by the improvement can hardly have any
very serious ground of complaint, even though the benefit which
made him whole was shared generally. Consequently in some states
the money appropriated for state highways and other public im-
provements is made to go further by permitting the state to off-set
against the landowner's claim for damages, not only special, but
general, benefits as well.2" The 1933 amendment to our statute was
2oBaneroft v. Boston, 115 Mass. 377 (1874); Blair v. Charleston, 43 W. Va.
62, 26 S. E. 341 (1896).
21 Swift & Co. v. Newport News, 105 Va. 108, 52 S. E. 821 (1906); Jones
v. Clarksburg, 84 W. Va. 247, 99 S. E. 484 (1919).
22 Compton v. County Court of Marshall County, 83 W. Va. 745, 99 S. E.
85 (1919).
23 Crane v. Harrison, 40 Idaho 186, 232 Pae. 578 (1925).
24 W. VA. CONST. art. II, § 9.
25 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) e. 54, art. 2, § 9.
20 Wade v. State Highway Comm., 188 N. C. 210, 124 S. E. 193 (1924);
Nowaezyk v. Marathon County, 205 Wis. 536, 238 N. W. 383 (1931).
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to that effect.27 In view of this express change of legislative poliey,
the recent West Virginia case of State v. Jacobs,28 has raised con-
siderable doubt as to the application of the present statute as re-
gards the deduction of benefits in cases involving damages to land
short of an actual taking. In the Jacobs case where damage was
done to realty by the change in grade of an adjacent highway,
the court, in reversing the judgment of the lower court on a verdict
of the jury for the State Road Commission, said: "Jury findings
in such cases are usually upheld.., but the res, speaking for itself,
tells unmistakably of injury... no special benefit to the property
is shown, and the general benefits from improving the highway
cannot be offset against damages of this character." This latter
statement of the court clearly does not encompass the spirit or let-
ter of the present statute unless it should be construed to apply
only to cases where there has been damage to the residue of land
actually taken, and not to cases in which only damage to the realty
by reason of some disturbance of an existing easement such as the
alteration in the grade of a highway is involved; and concededly,
this may well be considered the result of the decision on the basis
of stare decisis. That the court intended any such interpretation
be given the decision in the Jacobs case, however, seems improbable
in view of our earlier decisions to the effect that in the two types
of cases the moasure of damages is the same. 2" In support of this
view is the provision of our statute on procedure in eminent domain
cases which provides for proceedings of the same general character
to ascertain damages resulting from the construction or improve-
ment of a highway short of an actual taking, as in the case of land
actually taken.30 This factor of itself would seem sufficient to indi-
cate a legislative intent to apply the same section on the question
of ascertaining damages. And in fact, the recent case of Peddi-
cord v. County Court of Marshall County,31 involving damage with-
out a taking as in the Jacobs case, and decided only a few months
earlier, almost completely negatives this view for there it was said
27 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 54, art. 2, § 9, provides in part as follows:
"The commissioners .... shall ascertain what will be a just compensation to
the person entitled thereto for so much thereof as is proposed to be taken,
or for the interest therein, if less than a fee, and for damage to the residue
of the tract beyond all benefits to be derived, in respect to such residue, from
the work to be constructed .... .
28 5 S. E. (2d) 617 (W. Va. 1939).
29 Compton v. County Court of Marshall County, 83 W. Va. 745, 99 B. B.
85 (1919) ; Hardy v. Simpson, 118 W. Va. 440, 191 S. E. 47 (1937).
3o W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 54, art. 2, § 14.
313 S. E. (2d) 222 (W. Va. 1939).
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by the court that "section 9 of Article III of the state constitution
assures to an owner compensation for all damages sustained from
the taking or damaging of his property." Even more significant
still is the application of the same rule for establishing the quantum
of damages in this case where no land was taken as is applied in
cases involving damages to the residue of land taken. In view of
this decision, there is, therefore, hardly any point to the contention
that any different application would be made under the amended
statute.
That the new statute was not called to the attention of the
court in the Jacobs case, and so was not considered by it in stating
the rule as to the determination of damages seems the more plaus-
ible explanation. In the first place no mention of the statute ap-
pears in the opinion; and then the possible explanation that this
case is distinguishable as indicated above appears very remote.
Apparently, on the basis of dictum appearing in the case of Hardy
v. Simpson,32 decided in 1937, the court was not aware of the 1933
amendment to the statute; for in that case the court said: "In such
cases where there are peculiar benefits to the property, the same
may be set off against damages." And then again in the Peddicord
case involving damage short of a taking the court laid down the old
rule as to the deduction of benefits without mention of our statute
as amended in 1933.
To say the least, these cases leave the law on this point in a
confused state. So far as the writer is aware the court has not had
before it a case involving this point in which damage to the residue
of land taken was involved. Until such a case arises, or until the
change in the statute is called specifically to the attention of the
court, the exact purport of the Jacobs decision must rest more or
less in conjecture. Recent cases in other jurisdictions do give point
and support to the view of this note. In a recent North Carolina
case"3 construing a statute similar to our own on the point, the
court held that both general and special benefits shall be assessed
as off-sets against damages. To the same effect is an earlier North
Carolina case34 applying the same statute, the court saying: "All
the landowner can claim is that his property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation; and that is had .when the
balance is struck between the damages and the benefits conferred
on him by the act complained of. To that and that alone he has
32 118 W. Va. 440, 191 S. E. 47 (1937).
33 Bailey v. State Highway Comm., 214 N. C. 278, 199 S. E. 25 (1938).
34 Wade v. State Highway Comm., 188 N. C. 210, 124 S. E. 193 (1924).
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a constitutional and vested right." A Wisconsin statute on the
question of damages provides that in the exercise of eminent do-
main by the state in the case of streets or highways, damages and
benefits shall be allowed and the excess of one over the other shall
be stated. 5 Construed in a recent case,8 6 it was held to cover
benefits accruing to the general public as well as benefits resulting
specially to land taken.
In the later statutes and decisions is manifested a trend toward
the policy of considering all benefits in the determination of dam-
ages in these cases. This trend, as previously indicated, is nurtured
in the present policy of the state in trying to bring down excessive
costs of rights-of-way so as to make the money appropriated for
roads and other public improvements go as far as possible. Also
there has grown up a changed concept of the sacred character of
real property ownership which might tend to alter the basic theory
of "just compensation" in condemnation cases. But whatever the
basis of the present policy may be, this problem is a very real and
practical one; and it is unfortunate that our cases on this question
decided since the 1933 amendment to our eminent domain statutes
have failed to take cognizance of the change. It is submitted that,
in view of the evident legislative intent back of the statute, the
strong policy of today favorable to public improvement, and the
recent trend in other jurisdictions on the question as previously
shown, the present West Virginia statute should receive an in-
terpretation in all cases involving damage to property which per-
mits the deduction of both general and special benefits from the
aggregate damage suffered by the property.
D. R. K.
STATUTORY LARCENY IN WEST VIRGINIA
Larceny by Embezzlement. There being no embezzlement at
common law, statutes have been enacted to rectify certain defects
or "loopholes" existing in the law of larceny, so as to apply to the
fraudulent conversion of money or property otherwise not reached
by the common law. A clear understanding of the statute, "strictly
construed", 1 is necessray since embezzlement is generally regarded
as a separate and distinct crime, although commission of the offense
constitutes larceny.
35 Wis. STATS. (1935) C. 32, § 32.10 (1).
36 Nowaczyk v. Marathon County, 205 Wis. 536, 238 W. W. 383 (1931).
1 State v. Cantor, 93 W. Va. 238, 116 S. E. 396 (1923).
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